October 5, 2013, OpEdNews 
 
By William K. Black, J.D., Ph.D. 
 
We do not live in a "winner-take-all" Nation.  We increasingly live in a "cheater-take-all" system. This column was prompted by William Galston's review of Tyler Cowen's new book Average is Over.  Galston's column worries about the huge, permanent underclass that Cowen envisions will grow in the United States.  I write to challenge Cowen's assumption that winners will prevail through a process of "hyper-meritocracy." 
 
Reprinted from http://neweconomicperspectives.org/2013/10/hyper-meritocracy-oxymoron-led-criminal-morons.html#more-6527 
This column was prompted by William Galston's review of Tyler Cowen's new book Average is Over.   Galston's column worries about the huge, permanent underclass that  Cowen envisions will grow in the United States.  I write to challenge  Cowen's assumption that winners will prevail through a process of  "hyper-meritocracy."  Cowen's embrace of Social Darwinism assumes that  the winners have a selective advantage that arises from "merit" -- which  Cowen conflates with the ability to create wealth.  This is passing  strange as we are still suffering from an orgy of wealth destruction led  by the "winners."  The people who grew wealthiest were often the people  must responsible for the largest destruction of wealth in history.  In  this first column I show that it is the most anti-meritocratic system.   We do not live in a "winner-take-all" Nation.  We increasingly live in a  "cheater-take-all" system. 
 
What Cowen has missed is the famous (but nearly famous enough)  warning sounded by George Akerlof and Paul Romer in 1993 in their  classic article "Looting: The Economic Underworld of Bankruptcy for  Profit." 
"[M]any economists still [do] not understand that a  combination of circumstances in the 1980s made it very easy to loot a  [bank] with little risk of prosecution. Once this is clear, it becomes  obvious that high-risk strategies that would pay off only in some states  of the world were only for the timid. Why abuse the system to pursue a  gamble that might pay off when you can exploit a sure thing with little  risk of prosecution?" (Akerlof & Romer 1993: 4-5). 
 The result of these perverse incentives is the epidemics of  accounting control fraud that drive our recurrent, intensifying  financial crises.  In the savings and loan debacle, for example: 
"The typical large failure [grew] at an extremely rapid  rate, achieving high concentrations of assets in risky ventures".  [E]very accounting trick available was used". Evidence of fraud was  invariably present as was the ability of the operators to "milk' the  organization" (NCFIRRE 1993). 
 The large Enron-era frauds were all accounting control frauds. 
Worse, when cheaters prosper market forces become perverse because of  the "Gresham's" dynamic in which bad ethics drives good ethics out of  the markets and professions.  George Akerlof explained this in his most  famous article on "Lemons" in 1970. 
"[D]ishonest dealings tend to drive honest dealings out  of the market. The cost of dishonesty, therefore, lies not only in the  amount by which the purchaser is cheated; the cost also must include the  loss incurred from driving legitimate business out of existence." 
 Akerlof was not the first expert to understand the dynamic. 
"The Lilliputians look upon fraud as a greater crime than  theft.  For, they allege, care and vigilance, with a very common  understanding, can protect a man's goods from thieves, but honesty hath  no fence against superior cunning. . . where fraud is permitted or  connived at, or hath no law to punish it, the honest dealer is always  undone, and the knave gets the advantage" (Swift, J. Gulliver's Travels: 1726). 
 The mortgage fraud crisis occurred because the fraudulent CEOs whose  banks created the twin epidemics of mortgage origination fraud  deliberately generated a series of Gresham's dynamics that produced an  unethical race to the bottom in the professions that aided and abetted  the loan origination fraud.  The earliest warnings of this were made by  honest appraisers in 2000. 
"From 2000 to 2007, a coalition of appraisal  organizations " delivered to Washington officials a public petition;  signed by 11,000 appraisers". [I]t charged that lenders were pressuring  appraisers to place artificially high prices on properties [and]  "blacklisting honest appraisers" and instead assigning business only to  appraisers who would hit the desired price targets"( FCIC 2011: 18). 
 A national survey of appraisers conducted in early 2004 found that  75% of appraisers had been urged within the prior 12 months to inflate  an appraisal.  A 2007 survey found that the percentage of appraisers  reporting that they had been urged to inflate an appraisal within the  past 12 months had risen to 90% and honest appraisers were forced to pay  a high price for refusing to give in to the coercion: 68% reported  losing a client and 45% did not get paid for their work.  Note that a  Gresham's dynamic does not have to drive all the honest professionals  out of the field to produce epidemic levels of fraud.  Even if only a  small percentage of the appraisers are suborned they can inflate all the  appraisals required. 
New York Attorney General (now, governor) Cuomo investigation of  Washington Mutual (WaMu) found that it had blacklisted honest  appraisers.  Cuomo described WaMu as typical of nonprime lenders. 
Similar Gresham's dynamics have been documented in many crises and professions. 
"[A]busive operators of S&L[s] sought out compliant  and cooperative accountants.  The result was a sort of "Gresham's Law"  in which the bad professionals forced out the good" (NCFIRRE 1993). 
 Modern executive compensation is also a superb device for enlisting  the aid of hundreds or even thousands of employees and officers and  suborning internal controls.  It also reduces whistleblowing. 
"Don't just say: "If you hit this revenue number, your  bonus is going to be this.' It sets up an incentive that's overwhelming.  You wave enough money in front of people, and good people will do bad  things" Franklin Raines:  CEO, Fannie Mae. 
 Raines' analysis was correct, which explains why the bonus system he  put in place was so successful in turning Fannie Mae into one of the  world's largest and most destructive accounting control frauds. 
"By now every one of you must have 6.46 [earnings per  share (EPS)] branded in your brains.  You must be able to say it in your  sleep, you must be able to recite it forwards and backwards, you must  have a raging fire in your belly that burns away all doubts, you must  live, breath and dream 6.46, you must be obsessed on 6.46".  After all,  thanks to Frank, we all have a lot of money riding on it".  We must do  this with a fiery determination, not on some days, not on most days but  day in and day out, give it your best, not 50%, not 75%, not 100%, but  150%. 
Remember, Frank has given us an opportunity to earn not  just  our salaries, benefits, raises, ESPP, but substantially over and above if we make 6.46.  So it is our  moral obligation  to  give well above our 100% and if we do this, we would have made tangible  contributions to Frank's goals."  (Mr. Rajappa, head of Fannie's  internal audit, emphasis in original.) 
 The second epidemic of loan fraud by lenders created the epidemic of  fraudulent "liar's" loans.  The liar's loan epidemic interacted with the  appraisal fraud epidemic to hyper-inflate the real estate bubble and  created a financial catastrophe.  The fraudulent leaders of nonprime  lenders deliberately created a Gresham's dynamic among their loan  officers and their loan brokers.  Loan brokers did most of the dirty  work (giving the lenders deniability) of inflating appraisals and  putting the lies in liar's loans. 
"More loan sales meant higher profits for everyone in the  chain. Business boomed for Christopher Cruise, a Maryland-based  corporate educator who trained loan officers for companies that were  expanding mortgage originations. He crisscrossed the nation, coaching  about 10,000 loan originators a year". (FCIC 2011: 7) 
"His clients included many of the largest lenders--Countrywide,  Ameriquest, and Ditech among them. Most of their new hires were young,  with no mortgage experience, fresh out of school and with previous jobs  "flipping burgers,' he told the FCIC.  Given the right training,  however, the best of them could "easily' earn millions."  (FCIC 2011: 8 ) 
"He taught them the new playbook: "You had no incentive whatsoever to  be concerned about the quality of the loan, whether it was suitable for  the borrower or whether the loan performed.' He added, "I knew that the  risk was being shunted off. I knew that we could be writing crap. But  in the end it was like a game of musical chairs. Volume might go down  but we were not going to be hurt'" (FCIC 2011: 8 ). 
 "I knew that we could be writing crap."  Under the incentive  structures deliberately created by the officers controlling the lenders  the loan officers "had no incentive whatsoever to be concerned about the  quality of the loan, whether it was suitable for the borrower or  whether the loan performed."  To ensure that their new loan officers  understood and responded to the perverse incentives the fraudulent  lenders hired people like Christopher Cruise to train them to understand  and act in accordance with those incentives. 
The general reader may be confused as to why the CEOs leading the  fraudulent lenders were deliberately creating incentives to make  enormous numbers of bad loans.  The fraud "recipe" for an accounting  control fraud optimizing fraudulent income by making (buying) bad loans  has four ingredients. 
- Grow extremely quickly by
 
- Making (buying) bad loans at premium yield
 
- While employing extreme leverage, and
 
- Providing grossly inadequate allowances for loan and lease losses (ALLL)
 
 
 This is the recipe that produces what Akerlof and Romer aptly  described as a "sure thing" and that hyper-inflated the bubble and drove  the crisis.  The recipe produces three sure things: the lender  (purchaser) of "crap[py]" loans will immediately report record income,  the controlling officers will promptly be made wealthy through modern  executive compensation, and the firm will suffer severe losses. 
It is simple to follow the recipe.  No skill is required.  The fact  that the recipe can be employed simultaneously by the originator/seller  and the buyer of the fraudulent loans explains why the secondary market  followed the financial version of "don't ask; don't tell." 
Even the former head of the professional association of mortgage  brokers, while trying to minimize the success of the Gresham's dynamic,  actually conceded its critical importance. 
"Marc S. Savitt, a past president of the National  Association of Mortgage Brokers, told the Commission that while most  mortgage brokers looked out for borrowers' best interests and steered  them away from risky loans, about 50,000 of the newcomers to the field  nationwide were willing to do whatever it took to maximize the number of  loans they made. He added that some loan origination firms, such as  Ameriquest, were "absolutely' corrupt" (FCIC 2011: 14). 
 Ameriquest was not some random lender.  It was the fraudulent lender  that first developed liar's loans and it was for many years the largest  originator and seller of fraudulent loans.  Its CEO, Roland Arnall, was  made wealthy by the fraud -- wealthy enough to make the large political  contributions that got him appointed our Ambassador to the Netherlands  after the fourth time Ameriquest was subject to government sanctions.   It was Ameriquest that WaMu and Citicorp rushed to acquire even though  Ameriquest was the most notorious lender in America. 
Sadly, Savitt's estimate of fraudulent loan brokers was far too low.   When entry is easy -- and becoming a mortgage broker was simple -- and  the financial incentives to commit fraud are powerful the result is  horrific. 
"According to an investigative news report published in  2008, between 2000 and 2007, at least 10,500 people with criminal  records entered the field in Florida, for example, including 4,065 who  had previously been convicted of such crimes as fraud, bank robbery,  racketeering, and extortion" (FCIC 2011: 14). 
 A loan broker could make $2,000 to $20,000 by getting a single bad  loan approved.  But he got nothing if the loan was not approved.  The  brokers knew that that if they put the borrower into a liar's loan the  broker would receive a higher fee because such loans had a higher  interest rate (which increased the broker's compensation).  The brokers  knew that the lender would not verify the borrower's reported income on a  liar's loan.  If the broker inflated the borrower's income the lender  was far more likely to approve the loan.  The broker, but not the  borrower, knew how much to inflate the borrower's stated income. 
"[Many originators invent] non-existent occupations or  income sources, or simply inflat[e] income totals to support loan  applications. Importantly, our investigations have found that most  stated income fraud occurs at the suggestion and direction of the loan  originator, not the consumer."  Tom Miller, AG, Iowa, 2007 testimony to  Fed. 
 It was the lenders and their agents that put the lies in "liar's"  loans and that used coercion to inflate appraisals.  No honest lender  would create the perverse incentives sure to lead to fraudulent  epidemics of liar's loans and inflated appraisals. 
The constants present in each of our three modern financial crises  (the S&L debacle, the Enron-era scandals, and the mortgage fraud  crisis) were that the crises were driven by epidemics of accounting  control fraud and that during the expansion phase of each crisis  neo-classical economists praised the worst frauds as brilliant  innovators who understood the importance of technological advances.  The  economists assured us that the massive compensation that the fraudulent  CEOs awarded themselves was the just result of an emerging  meritocracy.  The reality was the opposite. 
"Neither the public nor economists foresaw that [S&L  deregulation was] bound to produce looting.  Nor, unaware of the  concept, could they have known how serious it would be.  Thus the  regulators in the field who understood what was happening from the  beginning found lukewarm support, at best, for their cause. Now we know  better.  If we learn from experience, history need not repeat itself"  (George Akerlof & Paul Romer.1993: 60). 
 Cowen does not discuss financial fraud, Akerlof and Romer's findings,  or the Gresham's dynamic in his book even though they are central to  his purported thesis.  He simply assumes that the financial frauds were  made wealthy because they were more "productive."  They were the  opposite of productive.  Cowen has adopted, implicitly, the label that  Christopher Cruise, the lead training official that the fraudulent  lenders chose to train their loan officers, used. 
"Most of their new hires were young, with no mortgage  experience, fresh out of school and with previous jobs "flipping  burgers,' he told the FCIC.  Given the right training, however, the best  of them could "easily' earn millions."  (FCIC 2011: 8 ) 
 Cruise and Cowen simply assume that whoever can "earn millions"  represents the "best" of Americans.  It can, but it can also represent  the worst of us.  Finance has become dominated by the worst of us, which  is why we have recurrent, intensifying financial crises driven by their  fraud epidemics.  Cowen looks at the results of our  hyper-anti-meritocracy system of finance, a gaudy whorehouse bedecked  with red neon lights.  Cowen concedes in his book (though it does lead  to any analytical inquiry) that finance executives are currently the  largest winners in gaining wealth despite causing the massive loss of  societal wealth in the ongoing crisis.  Without even discussing fraud or  why the people who are the leading destroyers of wealth were the  largest beneficiaries and experienced the greatest growth in wealth  since 2009 Cowen describes finance as if it were a temple of  meritocracy.  Cowen has demonstrated that when Akerlof and Romer said of  economists -- twenty years ago -- that "now we know better" about fraud  and financial crises they were far too optimistic about their  profession. 
 
 
 
 
Submitters Website: http://neweconomicperspectives.org/
  Submitters Bio:William K Black , J.D., Ph.D. is Associate Professor of Law and Economics at the University of Missouri-Kansas City. Bill Black has testified before the Senate Agricultural Committee on the regulation of financial derivatives and House Governance Committee on the regulation of executive compensation. He was interviewed by Bill Moyers on PBS, which went viral. He gave an invited lecture at UCLA’s Hammer Institute which, when the video was posted on the web, drew so many “hits” that it crashed the UCLA server. He appeared extensively in Michael Moore’s most recent documentary: “Capitalism: A Love Story.” He was featured in the Obama campaign release discussing Senator McCain’s role in the “Keating Five.” (Bill took the notes of that meeting that led to the Senate Ethics investigation of the Keating Five. His testimony was highly critical of all five Senators’ actions.) He is a frequent guest on local, national, and international television and radio and is quoted as an expert by the national and international print media nearly every week. He was the subject of featured interviews in Newsweek, Barron’s, and Village Voice.  |